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71 
WELCOMING WOMEN: RECENT CHANGES 
IN U.S. ASYLUM LAW 
Jillian Blake*† 
Introduction 
The Statue of Liberty, which has been called the “Mother of Exiles,” 
stands as a reminder of one of the foundational ideals of U.S. immigration 
policy—providing refuge to the vulnerable. Women worldwide have new 
reason to believe in this promise, because victims of domestic violence may 
now have a better chance of being granted asylum in a U.S. immigration 
court.  
In the summer of 2009, the Obama Administration made public a De-
partment of Homeland Security (“DHS”) brief submitted in the case of a 
Mexican woman who requested asylum based on the fear she would be 
killed by her former domestic partner if she returned to Mexico. The gov-
ernment’s brief in the case, the Matter of L-R-,1 proposed new legal 
justifications for granting battered women asylum, but stopped short of ad-
vocating a full grant of protected status. 
In December 2009, a U.S. immigration court granted asylum to a Gua-
temalan woman, Rody Alvarado, who suffered ten years of abuse from her 
husband in her native country. Ms. Alvarado’s case, the Matter of R-A-, had 
been in limbo for more than fourteen years. She was initially granted asy-
lum in 1996, but the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) overturned that 
decision three years later, finding that battered women were not a cogniza-
ble social group under the legal definition of refugee.2 
While these two recent developments are extremely encouraging for 
women’s rights advocates, the U.S. government has yet to finalize the legal 
rules governing asylum claims for victims of gender-based violence. This 
essay endorses a specific legal regime, based on the arguments made in the 
Matter of L-R- and Matter of R-A-, and relevant international treaties go-
verning asylum, and argues that deserving women should receive asylum 
protection in the United States. 
                                                                                                                      
* J.D. Candidate, May 2011, University of Michigan Law School. Winner of the Michigan 
Law Review First Impressions Essay Competition 2010. 
† Suggested citation: Jillian Blake, Commentary, Welcoming Women: Recent Changes 
in U.S. Asylum Law, 108 Mich. L. Rev. First Impressions 71 (2010), http://www. 
michiganlawreview.org/assets/fi/108/blake.pdf. 
 1. Brief of Dep’t of Homeland Security (April 13, 2009) (redacted) [hereinafter DHS 
Brief], available at http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/pdfs/Redacted%20DHS%20brief%20on%20PSG.pdf. 
 2. Matter of R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (B.I.A. 1999). 
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Is She a Refugee? 
The international legal community has long debated whether battered 
women could be considered refugees. According to the 1951 United Nations 
Convention Related to the Status of Refugees, as amended by a 1967 Proto-
col, a refugee is: 
A person who owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for rea-
sons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group 
or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable 
or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that 
country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of 
his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing 
to such fear, is unwilling to return to it . . . . 
This international definition is incorporated into U.S. law, with minor 
changes, via the Immigration and Nationality Act.3 The definition contains 
three core elements: a persecution ground—race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group, or political opinion; a nexus be-
tween the ground and the persecution suffered; and a lack of state 
protection. Because gender is not listed as a Convention ground, victims of 
gender-based persecution do not meet the definition of refugee. 
Nonetheless, groups not enumerated in this definition often claim refu-
gee status under the amorphous “membership of a particular social group” 
ground. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
a “particular social group” is: 
[A] group of persons who share a common characteristic other than the 
risk of being persecuted, or who are perceived as a group by society. The 
characteristic will often be one that is innate, unchangeable, or which is 
otherwise fundamental to identity, conscience or the exercise of one’s hu-
man rights.4 
This definition contains two important characterizations of a particular 
social group: immutability—members of the group share a trait that is in-
nate; and social perception—society views members of the group as such.  
The legal maxim ejusdem generis supports the first, immutability view. 
According to this rule, general words in a statute should be interpreted in 
light of more specific words, or general terms should be interpreted as being 
consistent with enumerated items. The other Convention grounds are either 
immutable—race and nationality—or traits so fundamental that a person 
should not be required to change them—religion or political opinion. There-
fore, if people share immutable characteristics, they can be said to form a 
particular social group. 
                                                                                                                      
 3. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42). 
 4. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Guidelines on International Protec-
tion, “Membership of a particular social group,” HCR/GIP/02/02 (May 7, 2002), available at http:// 
www.unhcr.org/3d58de2da.html. 
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The social perception test has been adopted and articulated by the Aus-
tralian High Court in Applicant S v. Minister for Immigration and 
Multicultural Affairs:  
First, the group must be identifiable by a characteristic or attribute com-
mon to all members of the group. Secondly, the characteristic or attribute 
common to all members cannot be the shared fear of persecution. Thirdly, 
the possession of that characteristic or attribute must distinguish the group 
from society at large.5 
In the United States, both immutability and social perception tests have 
been used to identify valid “particular social groups.” In the case Matter of 
Acosta, the BIA found the doctrine of ejusdem generis “to be most helpful 
in construing the phrase ‘particular social group.’ ”6 In Matter of C-A- the 
BIA declared that it would consider the “recognizability, i.e. the social visi-
bility, of the group in question.”7 
But even if victims of domestic violence can satisfy the first element of 
this test, they must also face the problem of establishing a causal link be-
tween the grounds for persecution and the persecution suffered. This nexus 
is established when the persecutor is motivated by the cognizable ground in 
inflicting the harm.8 “Women who suffer domestic violence in country X” 
would be an impermissibly circular social group. Battered women don’t 
suffer persecution because they are battered women—rather, the group is 
defined by a type of persecution. Furthermore, the particular social group 
“women in country X” would be too large. The word “particular” connotes a 
group that is certainly smaller than half the population.  
Recent Changes to U.S. Asylum Law 
In April 2009, DHS submitted a brief to the BIA in the Matter of L-R-, 
opening the door for battered women to be considered refugees under the 
“particular social group” category, in a way that mitigates the circularity and 
particularity problems. According to the brief, “DHS accepts that in some 
cases a victim of domestic violence may be a member of a cognizable par-
ticular social group and may be able to show that her abuse was or would be 
persecution on account of such membership.”9 
DHS argued that the particular social group for victims of domestic vi-
olence could be formulated by taking into account the way in which the 
abuser and society perceive their position in a domestic relationship. Accor-
dingly, a group could be “Mexican women in domestic relationships who 
are unable to leave” or “Mexican women who are viewed as property by 
virtue of their positions within a domestic relationship.” 
                                                                                                                      
 5. (2004) 217 C.L.R. 387 (Austl.). 
 6. 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 211 (B.I.A. 1985). 
 7. 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 958 (B.I.A. 2006). 
 8. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 482–83 (1992). 
 9. DHS Brief, at 12. 
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Following the public release of the DHS brief, Ms. Alvarado filed a brief 
arguing that she was a member of the social group “married women in Gua-
temala who are unable to leave the relationship,” similar in construction to 
the group, “Mexican women in domestic relationships who are unable to 
leave.” In October 2009, DHS responded that Ms. Alvarado was “eligible 
for asylum and merits a grant of asylum as a matter of discretion.” Two 
months later, the immigration court issued a summary decision, granting 
Ms. Alvarado asylum.10 
DHS outlined in its brief the legal justification for the particular social 
group “married women in Guatemala who are unable to leave the relation-
ship.” The social group is “broadly defined by gender, by marital status, her 
inability to leave the relationship, or by Guatemalan nationality.”11 DHS ar-
gued that the applicant’s marital status is immutable because it is an integral 
part of one’s religious and moral identity. And “even accepting the premise 
that one should be required to change marital status to avoid persecution, 
there may be circumstances in which it would be impossible to do so, such 
that the characteristic would be immutable for that reason.” 
Particular Social Group for Battered Women: A Final Rule  
Although the grant of asylum for Ms. Alvarado is a welcome develop-
ment, a final rule governing grants of asylum for victims of domestic 
violence should adopt the second category suggested by DHS, rather than 
the first: “Mexican women who are viewed as property by virtue of their 
positions within a domestic relationship.” This formulation better meets the 
immutability and social perception tests that govern grants of asylum under 
the current case law. Moreover, it is more likely to cover women deserving 
of international protection.  
The particular social group “married women in Guatemala who are una-
ble to leave the relationship” is not a coherent grouping for several reasons. 
First, the premise is self-contradictory—obviously the woman was able to 
leave the relationship because she is in a new country seeking asylum. 
Second, the reason for the persecution is unlikely to be that she cannot leave 
the relationship. More often it is that the persecutor has certain views of 
women. The fact that a woman cannot easily leave her marriage may make 
it easier for her husband to persecute her, but her inability to leave is not the 
core reason for the persecution. Third, it requires a negative view of mar-
riage in certain countries, as a male-dominated patriarchal institution. In 
fact, the problem of domestic violence is not inherently tied to the institu-
tion of marriage, but rather to the views of women held by men that they 
enter intimate relationships with. Finally, many women who suffer from 
                                                                                                                      
 10. Center for Gender & Refugee Studies, Documents and Information on Rody Alvarado’s 
Claim for Asylum in the U.S., http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/campaigns/alvarado.php. 
 11. Department of Homeland Security’s Position on Respondent’s Eligibility for Relief at 
27, In re Rody Alvarado-Pena, File No. A 73 753 922, available at http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/ 
documents/legal/dhs_brief_ra.pdf. 
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domestic violence are not married, so relying on marital status to fulfill an 
immutability requirement will exclude many women deserving of asylum.  
The second formulation proposed in Matter of L-R- avoids many of the 
pitfalls of the category accepted in Matter of R-A-. A final rule could follow 
the pattern: “Mexican women who are viewed as property by virtue of their 
positions within a domestic relationship,” which requires that an asylum 
seeker fall into each of the four categories—nationality, sex or gender, social 
situation, and social perception. The persecutor could be any private indi-
vidual, such as a domestic partner or husband.  
This second formulation is a rational social group for several reasons. 
First, the characteristic of gender is more immutable than the characteristic 
of being in a relationship or a marriage. This is because it is almost impossi-
ble to change gender, while it is indeed possible to leave a relationship, and 
in fact the applicant often will have left one already if she is applying for 
asylum in the United States. Second, the formulation correctly captures the 
reason for the persecution—that a woman is viewed as a piece of property 
or that there is some hatred towards women in the mind of the persecutor. 
Finally, the social situation is one that is common to the immutable group—
being in a domestic relationship—but doesn’t impose any value judgment 
on that relationship in and of itself. Therefore “women who are in domestic 
relationships” would not form a cognizable group. But “women who are in 
domestic relationships and viewed as subordinate by their partners” would. 
The proposed grouping is not circular, because merely being viewed as sub-
ordinate would not meet the criteria of persecution. Rather, the persecution 
would have to include some form of domestic violence, motivated by mem-
bership in the particular social group, which is exactly what the Refugee 
Convention calls for.  
Conclusion 
Women’s rights advocates have reason to be hopeful, because U.S. im-
migration courts appear more open to accepting asylum claims from 
battered women. At the same time, the current Administration must move 
forward in establishing a broad decision or set of guidelines for these cases. 
The final rule put forward by the government should reflect the social reality 
women face in their home country, and cover women most in need of inter-
national protection.  
